

Teacher Compensation and Performance: Policy Initiatives and Current Research

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The Level and Structure of Teacher Pay and Benefits

- Level
- Measurement – how competitive?
 - Base versus total pay (FLDOE report)
 - Benefits (pension, HI)
 - Reference groups / teaching field
 - Interstate?
 - Local labor market

Structure of Teacher Pay

- What gets rewarded?
 - Traditional salary schedule
 - Experience and graduate course work
 - Added pay for added duties
 - National Board Bonuses
 - Reforms
 - Incentives by field (shortage fields)
 - Incentives for low performing / high poverty schools
 - Incentives for superior performance
 - “Benefit lock” and career mobility
 - Backloading of benefits (DB pensions and retiree HI)
 - Experiments with DC / hybrid pensions (OH, FL)

Structure of Teacher Pay



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Effectiveness of new (and experienced) teachers is highly idiosyncratic

Most variation is within rather than between certification types

Variation in Teacher Effectiveness by type of Teacher Certificate:
New York City Public Schools, 1998-99 – 2004-05

Source: Kane, Rockoff, Staiger (2006, Fig. 6)



Research on Teacher Performance Pay

- Relatively few studies
- Wide range of programs, several countries
- Generally positive effects on student achievement or student outcomes (next slide)
- Need many more evaluations of US state/district initiatives
 - Texas (GEEAG)
 - FL (STAR)
 - MN (Q-Comp)
 - Denver ProComp
 - Nashville / NCPI randomized experiment
 - TIF Dept. of Ed.

Quantitative Studies of the Causal Effect of Teacher Incentive Programs on Measures of Student Achievement

Study	Sample	Time Span of Study	Type of Teacher Incentive	Size of Incentive (per teacher)	Outcome Variable	Results
Ladd (1999) Clotfelter and Ladd (1996)	Dallas grade 7 schools relative to other Texas urban districts ^[1]	1991-1995	School-wide (tournament)	\$1000	Math and reading test scores, dropout rates	Positive
Eberts, et.al. (2002)	2 MI alternative high schools (1 treatment, 1 control)	1994/95 – 1998/99	Individual	Up to 20% of base pay	Course completion rates, pass rates, daily attendance, GPA	Mixed
Lavy (2002)	Israel, high schools	1993-95 – 1996-97	School-wide (tournament)	\$200-\$715	test scores, pass rates, dropout rates, course-taking	Positive
Lavy (2004)	Israel, high schools	1999-2001	individual (tournament)	\$1750 - \$7500+ ^[2]	pass rates and test scores	Positive
Glewwe, et.al. (2004)	Primary schools, rural Kenya		School-wide	Up to 43% of monthly salary ^j	Grade 4, 8 test scores	Mixed
Atkinson, et.al. (2004)	UK High Schools	1997-2002	Individual	> 9% in salary base	English, Science, Math assessments	Positive
Figlio and Kenney (2006)	U.S. NELS88 matched, to FK survey or 1993-94 SASS, 12 th grade Public and private	1993	individual	Varied within sample	12 th grade, composite reading, math science and history score	Positive

Labor Market Effects

- Recruitment
- Intra-district mobility
- Inter-district mobility
- Professional retention